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Selling Democracy: Diplomacy,
Propaganda and Democratisation in
Taiwan
Gary D. Rawnsley
We will strengthen our efforts in publicising Taiwan’s outstanding achievements in
economic  development  and  political  democratisation  to  make  the  international
community understand better the significant role we can play.
Foreign Minister Dr Tien Hung-mao, June 5th 20011 
1 The consolidation phase of  democratic  transition confronts Taiwan with a paradox:
Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, but it is a democracy that is not considered a legitimate
actor in the international system. How can Taiwan resolve this dilemma and project an
image  of  itself  to  the  international  community  that  certifies  it  as  a  democracy
deserving recognition? Finding a solution will not be easy, as the absence of diplomatic
relations  of  any  weight  prevents  Taiwan  from  meaningful  political  foreign
engagements (Taiwan enjoys formal diplomatic relations with 27 governments, mainly
in Central and South America and Africa).  Taiwan is thus relegated to the fringe of
international politics and is outside a framework of relations and decision-making that
often has  a  direct  impact  on it.  In  theory,  Taiwan can no longer  be  neglected,  for
political scientists have long argued that it is impossible to ignore democracies that
base their sovereignty on a mandate conferred by the people through regular free and
fair elections. However, political reality can be a cruel intrusion on such idealism, and
drawing on these themes to appeal to international opinion or sense of justice risks
falling on deaf ears.  Taiwan has a population of  around 23.5 million;  it  holds more
elections than any other country except the United States and Switzerland, with voter
turnout rates regularly surpassing 70%; and the ruling party accepted the legitimacy of
its  defeat  in the 2000 election after  fifty  years in government.  Yet  Taiwan remains
outside the United Nations. Moreover, Taiwan’s most important democratic diplomatic
partners of the early 1990s severed relations with Taipei despite democratisation (South
Korea in 1992; South Africa in 1997). Democracy, it seems, is not universally recognised
as a mark of distinction, even by other democracies; the China-Taiwan competition for
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diplomatic allies suggests that international relations are still defined by strategic and
geopolitical interests of states. This is the reality of Taiwan’s diplomacy, and it is within
this  framework  that  propaganda  must  compensate  for  Taiwan’s  precarious
international  status.  In  short,  Taiwan  must,  to  paraphrase  Leonard2,  prove  its
relevance, and has decided to do so by profiting from the potential value of projecting
its commitment to the democratic ideal. 
2 This article is intended as an update of a discussion I started elsewhere3 before the 2000
election. The original research aimed to understand why and how Taiwan has engaged
in  propaganda—a  component  of  what  Joseph  Nye  has  termed  “soft”  power—to
reinforce what I described as “informal diplomacy”: 
Soft power works by convincing others to follow, or getting them to agree to, norms
and institutions that produce the desired behaviour. Soft power can rest on the
appeal  of  one’s  ideas  or  the  ability  to  set  the  agenda  in  ways  that  shape  the
preferences of others4.
3 So far, Chen Shui-bian’s election victory in 2000 has not had any significant impact on
the construction or implementation of Taiwan’s foreign policy. As discussed below, his
administration has identified a new set of policies and priorities, most of which extend
rather than contest the pragmatic approach adopted by his predecessor. Democratic
propaganda did not begin with Chen Shui-bian’s election in 2000. Indeed, the previous
KMT administration demonstrated that it recognised the importance of soft power in
its  final  years  of  presidential  power.  Foreign  Minister  Jason  Hu  spoke  in  1999  of
Taiwan’s “achievements in political democratisation, economic liberalisation and social
pluralism” as being “in tune with international trends”. “This fine image should be
recognised by the international community,” he said5. 
4 A series  of  external  events  has  presented new possibilities  and challenges  in  equal
measure for reactive (event-driven) propaganda, for example, the election of George W.
Bush  as  President  of  the  United  States,  and  of  course  the  terrorist  attacks  on
Washington and New York in September 2001. The biggest opportunity is undoubtedly
Taiwan’s  membership of  the World Trade Organisation,  opening up the prospect of
closer  political  ties  across  the  Taiwan  Strait  as  a  by-product  of  greater  economic
interaction. 
Aims
5 The present discussion is  interested in discovering how the completion of  Taiwan’s
transition  to  democracy  has  affected  the  propaganda  that  is  designed  to  reinforce
diplomacy activity, and suggests that democracy provides a new ideological context for
understanding  Taiwan’s  propaganda  behaviour.  It  has  little  to  say  about  the
consequences  of  any  particular  propaganda  strategy,  as  measurement  of  effect  is
almost  impossible.  For  example,  the  August  2002  issue  of  the  Taipei  Review (p.  37)
reported that “the American view of Taiwan has tended to become more favourable as
Taiwan has conducted democratic elections and fashioned a free-market economy. A
recent Gallup poll showed that 62% of Americans had a favourable image of Taiwan,
while 22% had an unfavourable view and 16% had no opinion. Two years ago, only 47%
had a favourable view of Taiwan”. Leaving aside important questions of method—how
many Americans were sampled? From where do they obtain their information about
Taiwan? How are favourable and unfavourable defined?—the poll does not provide any
explanation for these figures:  is  American opinion more favourable now because of
Taiwan’s  propaganda  (which  is  highly  unlikely)  or  because  of  the  very  act  of
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democratisation that has been discussed in the media and among American political
elites? Similarly, how can the competition between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) for allies in the Third World be understood through propaganda? Certainly
aid can be considered an act of propaganda—of the deed, often the most important
kind6 that  furthers  Taiwan’s  endeavours  to  raise  its  international  profile—but  most
developing  countries  recognise  the  economic  benefit  of  “renting”  their  allies  and
playing one China against the other. As Ian Taylor has observed, “it is probably true
that most Africans do not care much who is  the ‘real’  China or with whom official
diplomatic ties should be established. ...  However,  astute state elites… have become
conscious of the fact that the diplomatic competition between the two countries is a
diplomatic spat that elites in economically depressed countries […] are able to profit
from […]”7. 
6 My professional analyses of international propaganda—from the BBC and the Voice of
America in the Cold War, through Radio Moscow in the early 1990s, and on to Taiwan—
have concentrated on understanding why actors experience the need to disseminate
their policies, intentions, reactions, and in some cases ideologies, to a global audience.
This level of analysis allows us to appreciate how political actors imagine themselves,
and how they would like the rest of the world to reflect that image back to them. In
many senses, there is a sensible argument that in Taiwan’s case the consequences of
propaganda are insignificant,  and that Taiwan’s international position relies less on
any kind of power it may (or may not) have—soft or otherwise—and more on external
factors that are beyond its control, for example American support. Presidents Nixon
and Carter are judged responsible for Taiwan’s present isolation, while Clinton came
extremely close to conceding the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan. George Bush Jr., on
the other hand, has declared—much to the consternation of his advisers—he will do
“whatever  it  takes”  to  help  Taiwan  defend  itself8.  These  are  not  the  result  of
propaganda, so why should we be concerned with how Taiwan projects itself to the
international community? 
7 My  earlier  work  on  Taiwan  approached  the  relationship  between  propaganda  and
diplomacy through the lens of the unequal diplomatic contest between Taiwan and the
PRC9,  and  this  remains  a  valuable  method:  Even  after  Taiwan’s  successful
democratisation, this competition is still characterised by inequity in propaganda that
matches the unequal competition in the political spheres; moreover, the competition is
played  out  in  the  PRC’s  favour  because  it  receives  the  benefits  of  international
recognition. I have proposed that this competition can be measured by: the level of
public and political interest each side is able to generate according to their perceived
international  status;  the  ease  of  access  that  each  can  secure  to  the  government
machinery of third nation-states and multilateral forums, and the level at which this
occurs; and similarly the volume of interest the players can generate within, and their
access to, the media. My research has identified a positive correlation between the level
of media interest and diplomatic profile: Japan’s ties with Taiwan improved through
1997 and 1998, and among the factors which contributed to the upgrading of relations
is the increase in Japanese media coverage of Taiwan10. While I do not intend to revisit
these  debates  in  this  paper11,  it  is  worth  reiterating  that  the  unequal  competition
between the PRC and Taiwan makes propaganda an important diplomatic instrument
that both governments ignore at their peril.
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8 Moreover, democracy adds another problematic; democratic governments must appeal
to public opinion and the electorate for support and consent for sometimes onerous
political decisions and behaviour. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that domestic and
international propaganda sometimes lack the consistency required for success—that
they  are  addressing  different  constituencies  with  diverging  and  often  competing
interests, and this means the organisation, content and delivery of propaganda are in
danger  of  falling  out  of  synchronicity.  Thus,  while  Taiwan’s  democratisation  offers
more opportunities than pitfalls—the theme of this article—the risks associated with
having  to  satisfy  two  different  audiences  remain.  So,  for  example,  the  Chen
administration has adopted a very bold stance towards the PRC and has tested to the
limit  what  is  and  is  not  acceptable  to  Peking.  Chen  Shui-bian’s  recent  policy
pronouncements that Taiwan and China are “one country on each side” of the Taiwan
Strait (discussed below) demonstrate this; Chen is obviously appealing to his domestic
constituency because he is having to carve out a political identity that is very distinct
from  his  competitors  as  the  race  for  the  2004  presidential  election  begins.  Hence,
Chen’s administration is transforming into a more pro-independence creature than it
was at the time of his inauguration in May 2000. This stance, however, sits uneasily
with the image that Taiwan is trying to project overseas and in the United States in
particular—that Taiwan is a responsible member of the international community that
will  not provoke a war with the PRC. This is  the price of  democracy;  authoritarian
governments  do  not  have  to  face  these  kind of  problems,  for  they  face  no  serious
political challenge from within their borders. Hence, their domestic and international
propaganda tend to appear far more consistent. 
9 To  proceed,  we  should  be  mindful  of  Gregg  Wolper’s  judgement  that  propaganda
“remains the most useful term as long as readers understand that it does not imply the
use of dishonest methods of false information, although it  does not  necessarily exclude
them either” [emphasis added]12. Of course, we should not be at all surprised that the
pejorative meaning of propaganda still resonates. After all, the twentieth century saw
the  most  skilful  application  of  propaganda  in  the  service  of  totalitarianism.  The
association of propaganda with sinister pursuits guards the unwary against admitting
that  we  are  all  indeed  engaged  in  propaganda  as  much  as  we  are  its  victims.
Propaganda  stands  (erroneously)  accused  of  manipulation,  and  we  are  naturally
suspicious of any form of manipulation since it implies the secret exercise of power
that is beyond scrutiny or control.  In Philip Taylor’s colourful prose, propaganda is
considered a “disease which somehow afflicts our individual and collective capacity to
make up our own minds about what is happening in the world around us”.13
10 This  attitude  is  infectious  for  it  conditions  how  we  view  our  involvement  in
propaganda: Diplomats representing Taiwan throughout the world continue to insist
that “we” (Taiwan) do not engage in propaganda; rather, “we” tell the truth and simply
provide  factual  information  about  our  country.  “They”—meaning  the  Chinese
communists—engage in propaganda. It is, after all, the kind of insidious behaviour we
expect from Communists. Popular opinion assumes that only others whose cause we
repudiate do propaganda. However, academic research on the meaning and history of
propaganda is  more detached and reminds us  that  propaganda is  merely  an act  of
salesmanship,  whether  of  an ideology,  a  particular  political  system,  or  a  particular
government/state14.  Evidence  accumulated  from  Nationalist  China  in  the  1940s
suggests that its diplomats accepted this definition and valued the contribution that
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propaganda can make to their  work.  Most  enlightening are the papers of  a  former
Nationalist  Ambassador to the United States,  Wellington Koo,  currently archived at
Columbia University in New York. These reveal that in 1949 he was advised to hire a
prominent American public relations specialist whose clients had included an airline
and  Coca-Cola  to  promote  and  “sell”  Nationalist  China  in  the  United  States15.  The
significance  of  this  cannot  be  overstated,  for  it  reinforces  our  understanding  of
propaganda  as  an  act  of  salesmanship:  governments,  policies  and  ideologies  can
packaged and sold in the same way that soap, dog food or any other commodity is
branded and marketed. 
11 The problem with accepting a pejorative definition of propaganda that is embedded in
a  disapproving  or  moralising  discourse  is  that  it  positions  Taiwan  forever  on  the
defensive. Unless actors accept that they engage in propaganda, they will never be in a
position  to  understand  fully  how  to  do  it  properly  and  what  it  can  achieve.  It  is
unfortunate that the political competition with China has determined the propaganda
strategies pursued in Taipei. As recently as 1999, the battle for international hearts and
minds was structured around the disagreements between Taiwan and the PRC,  and
rhetoric in Taipei still resonated with Cold War symbolism. For example:
The PRC has made great efforts to help its friends in Africa. Last year, its donations
and loans to this region amounted to approximately US$500 million. During the
first half of this year, high-ranking government officials of the PRC paid 20 visits to
Africa.  These  developments  demonstrate  clearly  its  intention  to  contain  our
development in this region and sabotage our friendship with African allies16.
12 Moreover, the Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, Chang Fu-mei,
launched  in  2002  an  initiative  designed  to  strengthen Taiwan’s  propaganda  among
overseas Chinese communities. “In an apparent attempt to win the hearts of overseas
Chinese, China has been going all out in promoting its propaganda overseas,” he said.
“Thus  it  is  the  commission’s  priority  to  comprehensively  counter  such  efforts  by
Communist  China”17.  So  in  many  respects,  Taiwan’s  propaganda  is  still  organised
around  the  out-dated  Cold  War  rhetoric  that  was  associated  with  Free  China’s
ideological and geo-strategic struggle with the Communist regime in Peking; and this is
unfortunate  because  such  reactive  posturing  is  self-limiting  and  ultimately  self-
defeating.  Not  only  does  rebuttal—counter-propaganda—publicise  the  original
message,  but  it  also  throws  Taiwan  onto  the  defensive,  drowning  out  the  positive
themes that are more valuable. By resorting to the redundant Cold War reasoning that
propaganda is something that only the communists in Peking do, Taiwan’s attitude is
simply nourishing the popular attitude towards propaganda as something evil,  thus
inviting audiences to switch off from ALL forms of persuasion, including their own.
Moreover,  an unfavourable understanding of propaganda as a value-neutral activity
overlooks how credibility, balance, objectivity, accuracy and a proclivity for providing
only information and “the facts” are all used to sell a political message in much the
same way that one might use more overt and familiar propaganda techniques. Nicholas
Pronay branded this “propaganda with facts”18. 
13 How does  this  relate  to  our  understanding  of  diplomacy?  Hans  J.  Morgenthau,  the
patriarch of realist international relations, defined diplomacy as the “promotion of the
national  interest  by peaceful  means”,  and he reserves a  special  place in his  Politics
Among Nations for showing how communications and propaganda do play an integral
role in the conduct of diplomacy and international relations: 
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Regardless of the instrument employed, the ultimate aim of foreign policy is always
the same: to promote one’s interests by changing the mind of the opponents. To
that end, diplomacy uses the persuasiveness of promises and threats in terms of the
satisfaction of the denial of interests; military force … [and] propaganda, the use
and  creation  of  intellectual  convictions,  moral  valuations,  and  emotional
preferences  in  support  of  one’s  own  interests.  All  foreign  policy,  then,  is  the
struggle for the minds of men; but propaganda is so in the specific sense that it
endeavours  to  mould  the  minds  of  men  directly  rather  than  through  the
intermediary of the manipulation of interests or physical violence19.
14 Diplomacy is about communication, persuasion and negotiation, and less about “war by
other means”. This close association between the two activities implies that diplomats
cannot, and should not, ignore the contribution that propaganda can make to their
work.  After all,  as  Peter Marshall  has observed,  diplomacy is  about persuasion,  not
imposition20. 
Taiwan’s pursuit of soft-power
15 Diplomacy involves a specific type of propaganda that is conditioned by, but at the
same time reinforces,  the formal or informal nature of the diplomacy. Moreover,  it
works across a variety of time frames, as propaganda proceeds at a pace that is relative
to both the objectives of the diplomacy and the diplomatic environment. Hence, the
formation of foreign policy and the design of propaganda should not be considered
discrete  activities.  Consistency  is  essential,  with  the  propaganda  reinforcing  and
serving specific diplomatic aims.
16 The foreign policy objectives of Chen Shui-bian’s government are21: National security
and  defending  de  facto Taiwan’s  sovereignty;  Strengthening  bilateral  relations  with
other democracies, especially in the Asia-Pacific region (the United States and Japan in
particular),  and  integration  in  regional  forums;  Persuading  the  international
community that Taiwan should be allowed to enter intergovernmental organisations,
including the United Nations and all its agencies; Promoting friendly relations across
the  Taiwan  Strait;  Fostering  democratisation  in  China;  Linking  Non-Governmental
Organisations in Taiwan and elsewhere22; and Strengthening and promoting Taiwan’s
democracy.  This  entails  the  repeated  recitation  of  the  so-called  Taiwan  “economic
miracle”. It also means affirming that Taiwan has experienced an irreversible process
of political and social transformation into the modern constitutional democracy that
was envisaged by its founders in 1947. 
17 The  final  aim  informs  all  the  others:  fulfilling  these  diplomatic  objectives  will  be
impossible unless Taiwan can persuade the international community that it deserves
serious attention because of  its  democratic  credentials.  While the story of  Taiwan’s
economic miracle is well known throughout the world23, its political transformation is
less  familiar.  Hence,  the  Chen  administration  has  made  the  projection  of  Taiwan’s
democracy the cornerstone of its foreign policy:
We  are  a vibrant  democracy  with  full  sovereignty.  Unfortunately,  we  still  find
ourselves rejected by the international community ... We do not export arms, steal
nuclear  know-how,  lob  missiles  over  other  countries,  invade  our  neighbours,
persecute  scholars  and  religious  worshippers,  or  violate  human  rights.  We  are
isolated simply because of the fact of our proximity to our formidable neighbour
across the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, unlike other pariah states, we have managed to
develop and modernise our economy, and even to democratise our polity24. 
18 In  short,  the  Chen Shui-bian government  is  committed to  a  pro-active  propaganda
strategy  organised around a  single  message  that  integrates  Taiwan’s  foreign policy
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interests and is value-driven: communicating the idea of democracy—that democracy is
essentially “good”, facilitating peace and co-operation. This is a stark juxtaposition to
the way Taiwan portrays the PRC—as a political system that should change; and that, as
a democracy, Taiwan’s mission is to engineer that change. Hence, the aim of fostering
democracy in the mainland is more than a flourish of political rhetoric for domestic
consumption;  it  is  designed to  remind international  audiences  that  the  China  they
recognise as a legitimate member of the international system and accept as a member
of the UN is not a democracy, and that the very idea of democracy can be a powerful
tool for political change. 
19 So, Taiwan is turning more to soft power to pursue its foreign policy interests and is
assembling a long-term information strategy that avoids the sloganeering of the Cold
War. This is illustrated in the conclusions of a meeting of President Chen and officials
from the  Presidential  office,  members  of  the  Executive  Yuan and the  DPP held  on
September 8th 2002. The relevant propositions suggest the marriage by the democratic
ideal of propaganda and diplomacy: set up a “Taiwan Democracy Foundation” to liase
with democratic organisations in developed countries; push for the establishment of an
Asia-Pacific democratic alliance to advance democracy in the region; use state-owned
media  outlets  as  a  “voice  of  Taiwan”  to  promote  democracy  in  the  region;  invite
Chinese leaders to observe the upcoming elections in Taiwan and offer to help train
election staff in China; push for the establishment of an “overseas Chinese democracy
alliance” to win support from overseas Chinese and international friends; and reiterate
the government’s position that only the 23 million people of Taiwan have the right to
decide the future of the country and that they are entitled to democratic measures
including a referendum to this end25.
20 The Chen administration has  developed several  innovative  methods of  pursuing its
foreign  policy  objectives:  “Democracy-based  diplomacy”;  “Human  Rights-based
diplomacy”; “Civilian-based diplomacy”; “Public Opinion-based diplomacy”; and “Inter-
parliamentary diplomacy”.  Officially launched in April  2002,  the latter refers to the
creation of relations between parliamentarians in Taiwan and other democracies. One
member  of  Taiwan’s  parliament,  the  Legislative  Yuan,  noted  how  “lawmakers—
representing the opinions of the 23 million people in Taiwan—are the ideal choices to
demonstrate the fruits of democracy and liberty by linking Taiwan to the international
community”26.  While Taiwan’s  legislators have always been involved in this  kind of
diplomacy—Taiwan has been a member of the Asian-Pacific Parliamentarians’ Union
since  1965—democratisation  has  given  their  participation  in  these  activities  more
credibility, for directly elected parliamentarians representing the entirety of Taiwan’s
political spectrum are now fully involved in their engagement with the international
community.  In  other  words,  who  better  to  promote  Taiwan’s  democracy  than  the
democrats themselves? 
21 In addition to being the product of the kind of creative mind that Taiwan’s diplomacy
requires,  these  different  methods  share  a  foundation  in  the  island’s  democratic
political  system.  They  represent  the  attempt  to  demonstrate  that  in  a  democracy,
“Diplomacy is too important to be left to diplomats”27.  They are consistent with the
administration’s  belief  that  everyone in  Taiwan is  responsible  for,  and can make a
positive  contribution to,  Taiwan’s  diplomacy.  The  specified  objectives  aspire  to  the
decline of diplomatic elitism and the promotion of a more inclusive foreign policy. In
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this  context,  Dr  Tien  has  spoken  of  the  need  for  “total  mobilisation”  in  realising
Taiwan’s foreign policy ambitions28. 
22 The list of diplomatic objectives reveals that Taiwan’s foreign policy is still essentially
driven  by  its  relations  with  the  People’s  Republic.  This  is  understandable:  Peking
continues to cast such a long shadow over Taiwan that political and public discourse
still tends to be structured around the issue of cross-Strait affairs, especially during
election  campaigns.  Dr  Tien  Hung-mao’s  most  urgent  responsibility  when  he  was
appointed Foreign Minister was to calm fears, within Taiwan, among its allies (formally
recognised or otherwise) and in Peking, that a Chen Shui-bian administration need not
necessarily lead to the outbreak of war across the Taiwan Strait. The fears were logical:
Chen represented a party that had campaigned in previous elections on the platform
that Taiwan should declare “independence”, and thus give up any pretence that it can
reunify with China on Taiwan’s terms. Although Chen had avoided this platform in the
2000  election  campaign,  Peking  still  claimed  that,  if  elected,  he  would  promote  or
declare Taiwan’s independence, thus giving a pretext for China to attack the island.
Sensitive  to  Peking’s  concerns,  and  grateful  that  Taiwan’s  voters  had  elected  him
President despite China’s rhetoric (albeit without a majority; Chen won only 39.3% of
the vote), Chen moved quickly to ease fears that a new crisis was on the horizon. His
inaugural speech launched what has been termed a “peace offensive” that included the
now (in)famous “five no’s”29, namely: 1) no declaration of Taiwan’s independence; 2) no
change in the name “Republic of China”; 3) no revising the constitution to suggest that
Peking and Taipei should negotiate on the basis of “special state-to-state” relations; 4)
no referendum to decide Taiwan’s status; and 5) no abolition of the National Unification
Council30 as long as China does not attack Taiwan. In addition, Chen proposed to set up
direct  sea  and  air  links  across  the  Taiwan  Strait  provided China  could  guarantee
Taiwan’s security. These concessions seemed to send Peking a positive message: after
Chen’s  inauguration,  China’s  belligerence  subsided,  and  “a  modest  resumption  of
negotiations in due course is conceivable…”31. 
23 Yet democracy has also tempted Taiwan to be bolder and more assertive in its relations
with China. It has endeavoured to push the boundaries even further, to test its newly-
discovered confidence in the belief that public opinion and the United States will come
to  Taiwan’s  aid  if  and  when  military  conflict  breaks  out  across the  Taiwan  strait.
Taipei’s decision to change the wording of passports to read “issued in Taiwan” instead
of  “The  Republic  of  China”  is  the  latest  provocation  to  Peking’s  sensitivities.
Meanwhile, George W. Bush has gone further than any American president since Nixon
in affirming security ties between Washington and Taipei—a sentiment shared by both
Richard Halloran, formerly of the New York Times, and Robert Sutter in a recent Issues
and  Studies32—thus  ending  the  strategic  ambiguity  that  allowed  the  US  to  support
Taiwan while preserving its commitment to the “One China” policy.
24 The boldest move so far was in August 2002 when President Chen referred to what has
become known as the “one country on each side” theory. In a telecast Chen announced
that “Taiwan’s future and destiny can only be decided by the 23 million people living
on the island […] with Taiwan and China on each side of the Taiwan Strait, each side is a
country.” He went on to affirm that “Our Taiwan is  not something that belongs to
someone else. Our Taiwan is not someone else’s local government. Our Taiwan is not
someone  else’s  province”33.  It  is  hardly  surprising  that  the  Chinese  government  in
Peking  viewed these  statements  as  provocative,  the latest  in  a  developing  political
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agenda that seems to suggest Chen Shui-bian is becoming ever more willing to push
Taiwan’s independence. As a propaganda device, the statement had little effect, other
than  spark  the  usual  debates  among  pro-  and  anti-independence  activists  within
political circles and the media (especially in Taiwan and the United States).  In fact,
there is every reason to suspect that making this statement was inappropriate at a time
when  the  United  States,  a  key  player  in  maintaining  cross-Strait  peace,  had  more
pressing concerns—continuing the war against terrorism, and building an international
coalition  (that  Washington  hoped  would  include  Peking)  in  the  United  Nations  in
support  of  military  action  against  Iraq.  The  United  States  does  not  welcome  any
distraction from these objectives, especially one that serves to heighten tension with
the PRC and risks dragging Washington into any cross-Strait conflict, hot or cold. 
25 On  the  issue  of  direct  links  across  the  Taiwan  Strait,  Taipei’s  propaganda  has
experienced  difficulties  in  presenting  a  justifiable  argument  for  rejecting  Peking’s
overtures. In May 2002 Qian Qichen, the Chinese Vice Premier, announced that that
negotiations  on  three  links—transport,  trade  and  postal  services—could  proceed  as
long as both sides accepted that this was a domestic economic matter: “Since the issue
of the three direct links is a purely economic affair, related talks can leave out the
political meaning of one China”, he said. This was intended to placate Taiwan’s business
community  who  have  longed  advocated  direct  links  between  the  two  sides  of  the
Taiwan  Strait.  Taipei’s  response  was  welcoming,  but  cautious:  direct  links,  said
President Chen, are “not a cure-all” for the problems that separate Taiwan and the
PRC34.
26 While  explanations  for  Taiwan’s  hesitation  are  embedded  within  the  complicated
historical, political and strategic relationship between the two sides, it is clear that this
is evidence of Peking seeking the moral high ground: how can anyone object to such
offers of negotiation that do not require discussion of seemingly intractable political
problems? The Chen administration could not, therefore, reject the proposals outright
because  it  would  then  be  viewed  as  unreasonable;  neither  could  it  simply  accept
Peking’s  advances  because  then  it  might  be  seen  as  appeasing  the  PRC.  In  the
circumstances,  therefore,  caution  and  hesitation  were  the  best  that  the  Chen
administration could offer.
27 What is most interesting from the perspective of propaganda has been the response by
Taiwan’s media to Qian Qichen’s statement. For example, an editorial by Taiwan’s The
Liberty Times newspaper applied the classic propaganda device of scare-mongering to
raise fears of direct links among its domestic readers: “Once direct links open, tourists
from  China  may  come,  because  it  is  compatible  with  Peking’s  policy  of  engulfing
Taiwan”35. Another editorial was equally fearful: “Direct links will shake the national
identity,  the beliefs of the people and Taiwan’s democratic system. Direct links will
cause  a  further  outflow  of  businesses  and  capital  and  a  hollowing  out  of  local
industries. The day direct links are established will be beginning of Taiwan’s absorption
into China”36. While it is impossible to establish without focus group research and the
commissioning of wide-scale opinions whether or not voters in Taiwan are persuaded
by such propaganda, these editorials nevertheless draw our attention to the language
that the anti-China constituency uses, and indicates how it remains prepared to resort
to the Cold War imagery of hordes of Chinese ready to “engulf” Taiwan. Divisive issues
such as cross-Strait relations continue to prompt the most emotive kind of propaganda
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on both sides. Does such polemic facilitate reasoned judgement, clear decision-making,
and valuable diplomatic communication? 
28 The horrifying terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001 offered
Taiwan an opportunity to reaffirm its tacit alliance with Washington and present itself
as  democratic  member of  the international  community that  also felt  threatened by
international terrorism. Taiwan has offered assistance to the United States in fighting
the war against terrorism, and to the United Nations in helping with its humanitarian
work in war-ravaged Afghanistan: “As a member of the international community and a
democratic ally,” said President Chen Shui-bian, “the Republic of China will support the
United States in its actions against terrorist organisations and endorse various anti-
terrorist  conventions  and  resolutions  proposed  by  the  United  Nations”37.  The
propaganda  is  clear;  Taiwan  is  willing  to  make  a  positive  contribution  to  an
international  system that  shuns it,  and to  support  United Nations resolutions even
though  it  is  denied  membership  of  that  organisation.  Such  statements  help  the
government  to  demonstrate  the  absurdity  of  Taiwan’s  present  status  and  generate
international sympathy based on its democratic credentials. 
29 However, the reality is that democratisation has not really increased Taiwan’s visibility
at all, even though the lifting of martial law in 1986 was a positive and long-overdue
development that allowed Taiwan to finally ensure that reality lived up to the rhetoric
of “Free China”. Describing the momentous changes that have taken place in Taiwan,
Jason C. Hu, a former Director-General of the Government Information Office (GIO) and
KMT foreign minister, has expressed sadness that “perhaps because these reforms were
not  achieved  at  the  cost  of  bloodshed  or  social  turmoil  they  have  ...  not  gotten
sufficient press or attention”38. Taiwan is considered sufficiently “news-worthy” only
when further, more dramatic ingredients are added: the military threat from the PRC,
aeroplane  crashes,  earthquakes,  train  crashes  in  the  United  Kingdom  that  kill
Taiwanese  citizens.  In  other  words,  Western  public  opinion  is  most  familiar  with
Taiwan through negative news stories and images. If the government wishes to make
sure that Taiwan’s democratisation is promoted, its diplomats and GIO officers abroad
must  find  new  ways  of  managing  the  news  that  circumvent  such  a  gloomy
representation. Manufacturing interest in Taiwan will raise its profile in the media, and
encourage awareness of the issues it faces. As Jacques Ellul noted in his seminal study of
propaganda, timeliness is important. “Propaganda”, he observed, “can have solid reality
and power over man only because of its rapport with fundamental currents, but it has
seductive excitement and a capacity to move him only by its ties to the most volatile
immediacy”39.
30 In 1949, the Nationalist embassy in the United States hired Norman Paige, a former ABC
correspondent with vast experience of the Far East and responsible for the “best” radio
station in the Philippines. Paige recognised that media attention to the China situation
had waned: “We will have to get your story back on page 1,” he told Joseph Ku, “and
that is difficult to do without the benefit of spectacular news stories”40. Thus, President
Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University in 1995 certainly captured the attention of the
world’s media, and the press in the United States, Japan and Hong Kong all came out in
support  of  closer  relations  with Taiwan41.  Such coverage helped raise  awareness  of
Taiwan: “If you now ask Canadians on the streets who President Lee is, they know,”
reported the Free China Journal on January 19th 1996 following his controversial visit to
Cornell. “Before that, their knowledge about Taiwan was limited”. As the head of the
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Taipei Representative Office in the United Kingdom, Dr Tien Hung-mao is striving to
develop  stronger  lines  of  communication  with  the  British  media  than  any  of  his
predecessors, agreeing to regular interviews with the BBC, the Daily Telegraph and The
Economist.  Journalists  are  thus  a  crucial  link  in  Taiwan’s  horizontal  network  of
communication  and  propaganda  in  the  UK.  Moreover,  Dr  Tien  is  committed  to
practising the more personal style of diplomacy that he promoted as Foreign Minister,
regularly attending functions organised by the British-Taiwan Parliamentary Group,
the Foreign Office, universities, and Britain’s major political parties42. This gives Dr Tien
a direct opportunity to discuss with influential individuals in British politics and civil
society the Taiwan political miracle he is dedicated to advertising. 
31 One  of  the  most  surprising  discoveries  of  my  original  research  was  that  neither
diplomats nor GIO officers received any formal instruction in how to use, or interact
with,  the  media  of  the  countries  where  they  are  stationed.  This  was  a  serious
indictment  of  their  approach  to  modern  diplomacy  given  that  Taiwan  depends  on
propaganda for evading the problems of non-recognition. Now, however, it looks as
though the  situation is  set  to  change:  As  Foreign Minister,  Dr  Tien Hung-mao was
responsible for creating an Institute of Diplomacy in Taipei that will offer instruction to
both diplomats and representatives of Taiwan’s growing number of non-governmental
organisations. The curriculum will include training in the art of public diplomacy, a
development that should facilitate the future realisation of Taiwan’s commitment to
publicising its democratic qualifications. 
32 THE REPRESENTATIVES of those governments and states that do not enjoy diplomatic
recognition find it incredibly difficult to perform even the most cursory of symbolic
functions,  given  that  they  are  outside  the  diplomatic  circle43.  To  overcome  these
problems, Taiwan is exploring and developing creative methods of diplomacy, all  of
which involve propaganda. Selling Taiwan involves the same techniques used in selling
any commercial product or service: identifying themes, messages and styles of delivery
that will appeal to the audience that the source wishes to persuade.
33 The Cold War offered Taiwan the opportunity to exploit the international ideological
divisions and describe itself as “Free China”, though the credibility of that label was
undermined by the reality of martial law. It is ironic that, with the end of the Cold War
and the creation of a democratic Taiwan, that label―perhaps more relevant today than
at any time in the past―has disappeared. This is in recognition that “Free China” is
today a rhetorical device with less symbolic resonance than “democratic Taiwan”. This
is  not  to  deny  that  the  Cold  War  casts  a  long  shadow  over  Taiwan’s  propaganda
organisation as it does relations with the PRC. As I write, the Asia-Pacific is gripped by
concern over the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) that allegedly originated
in Guangdong province in China. Taiwan is engaged in a fierce verbal attack against the
PRC, blaming the Chinese government for keeping quiet about the disease for too long,
and for keeping Taiwan outside the World Health Organisation when membership may
have helped control, if not prevent, an outbreak on the island. 
34 With democracy come new challenges: propaganda addresses several constituencies,
often  with  diverging  and  often  competing  interests.  Under  the  Chen  Shui-bian
administration,  the  dangers  lie  in  the  policy-making  community  rather  than  the
propaganda designed to communicate its decisions. After all, the damage caused by an
assertive, yet careless China policy may be so extensive that it is beyond rescue by even
the most sophisticated spin. The backlash (within Taiwan and the PRC) against Chen’s
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“one  country  on  each  side”  model  demonstrates  that  policy  and  propaganda  must
proceed with  caution  to  maintain  the  idea  Taiwan is  a  responsible  member  of  the
international  community,  while  avoiding  antagonising  Peking  further  and
communicating what might be termed the arrogance of democracy. 
35 While  public  relations  alone  will  not  solve  Taiwan’s  diplomatic  difficulties,  a  well-
constructed  propaganda  machinery  and  message  that  is  consistent  with  the
government’s foreign policy objectives offers long-term possibilities. In contrast to the
kind of  Cold War rhetoric that trapped Taiwan’s propaganda in a limiting mindset,
democracy provides Taiwan’s propaganda with an enduring and appealing theme, and
Chen  Shui-bian’s  government  appears  enthusiastic  in  exploring  every  conceivable
avenue  to  convey  its  message.  Whether  anyone  is  listening  is  another  matter
altogether. After all,  as Taiwan is fast learning, democracy does not come with any
guarantees, and of course no propaganda organisation can control the pace and extent
of diplomatic change. However, Taiwan can take comfort from evidence that suggests
its democratic propaganda does seem to be reaching the right people: In June 2002, US
Secretary of State Colin Powell told the Asia Society, “People tend to refer to Taiwan as
‘The Taiwan Problem’. I  call  Taiwan not a problem, but a success story. Taiwan has
become a resilient economy, a vibrant democracy and a generous contributor to the
international community”.44 
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